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Water deprivation as military
strategy in the Middle East, 3.700
years ago
Karel Van Lerberghe, David Kaniewski, Kathleen Abraham, Joël Guiot and
Elise Van Campo
Our stays at Cornell University have always been extremely pleasant thanks to Prof. David Owen,
curator, and the staff of the tablet collection. The complete archive is exhaustively being published
in three volumes in the series CUSAS (Cornell University Studies in Assyriology and Sumerology)
where translations, transliterations, hand copies and short comments are given.
1 Ancient and modern History has revealed that, even if there has never been a formal
declaration of war over water recorded (BARNABY, 2009), a freshwater deficit has the
potential to spark hostility in semi-arid countries sensitive to political conflicts (GLEICK et
 al., 1994; ALLEN, 1998; ALLAN, 2002; ASHRAF, 2003; ASSAL, 2006; REUVENY, 2007; ADGER 
et al.,  2013; SOLOW,  2013; SELBY and HOFFMANN,  2014; KELLEY et al., 2015). Competition
for limited water resources in these areas has frequently provided a justification for war,
becoming an object of military conquest, a source of political strength, and both a tool
and target of conflict (GLEICK et al., 1994). In the academic literature and popular press,
the topics "water" and "war" are invariably assessed together in writings that point to
the arid Middle East as an example of a worst-case scenario (WOLF, 2000). The warnings
have increased as the Middle East remains one of the most water-challenged regions in
the world (GLEICK et al., 1994; ALLAN, 2002) and, throughout the last 40 years, several
dryland countries (Turkey, inland Syria, Iran, Jordan, Israel) have experienced a severe
decline in precipitation (KAFLE and BRUINS, 2009; TAYANÇ et al., 2009; AL-QINNA et al.
, 2011; SOLTANI et al.,   2012). Drought periods have been recurrent in an irregular and
non-uniform way, but with the uppermost severity, magnitude and duration over the last
decade  (AL‑QINNA  et al., 2011),  giving  insufficient  inputs  to  aquifers  and  freshwater
supplies to regenerate. Juxtaposed with other economic, political, ideological and social
variables, these dry phases may act as a “threat multiplier” (EVANS, 2008; SOWERS et al.
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, 2011) and may exacerbate water-related tensions (see special issue of Méditerranée 119,
2012, Water in the Eastern Mediterranean).
2 While the use of scarce freshwater supplies as a “weapon of war” has occurred several
times in History (CHARPIN,  2002;  GLEICK and HEBERGER,  2013),  this  military process
reached a peak in Iraq at the end of the 20th century Current Era (CE). The first Gulf War
and its aftermath have shown the perverted role of human control over water in the
Middle East (AMERY, 2002; ISSA et al., 2013). More than a decade of drought in Iraq (AL-
TIMIMI and AL-JIBOORI,  2013) (Figs 1-2),  exacerbated by the deliberate and intensive
drainage of the Mesopotamian marshes by Saddam Hussein’s regime to evict the Shi’a
Muslim population from the southern territories,  created a social  and environmental
disaster (LAWLER, 2005; RICHARDSON and HUSSAIN, 2006; MACLEMAN, 2011).
 
Figure 1 - Maps (longitude, latitude) showing the precipitation anomalies for the decade 1990-2000
CE (Saddam Hussein’s regime) and for the period 3650-3750 BP (King Abieshuh’s reign).
The anomalies are calculated versus the previous periods: 1901-1990 CE for Saddam Hussein’s
regime and 3750-3850 BP for King Abieshuh’s reign. They are expressed as a percent of their 20th
century CE average
Maps created and drawn by the authors, using R software.
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Figure 2 - Modern climate parameters displayed as ombrothermic diagrams and evolution of
temperature-precipitation since 1900 CE
(a) Ombrothermic diagram for the period 1990-2009 CE; (b) ombrothermic diagram for the period
1960-1990 CE; (c) ombrothermic diagram for the period 1930-1960 CE; (d) ombrothermic diagram for
the period 1900-1930 CE; (e) average temperature for each period plotted as a histogram and
smoothed using a polynomial curve (R2=1); (f) precipitation for each period plotted as a histogram and
smoothed using a polynomial curve (R2=1).
3 Until the 1970s, the Mesopotamian marshes had covered an area of up to 20,000 km2, and
had fed an estimated population of 250,000 Shi'as. Today, less than 10% of the original
marsh and 20,000 of the original inhabitants remain. These southern marshes, primarily
fed by the Tigris (Al-Hawized Marshes) and the Euphrates (Al-Hammar Marshes) or both
(Qurna or Central Marshes), are considered by many to be one of the cradles of western
civilization and are often referred to as the biblical “Garden of Eden” (RICHARDSON e al.,
2005).  In Iraq,  the Tigris,  Euphrates,  and the Mesopotamian marshes,  have sustained
social  and  urban  development  since  the  Ubaid  period  7000  years  ago  (CARTER  and
PHILIP, 2010; HRITZ et al., 2012). They not only constitute permanent sources of water,
but also foster the abundant food stores that have supported socio-economic and cultural
developments  for  so  many  millennia.  But  in  the  1990’s,  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime
attempted  to  eradicate  these  people  by  destroying  the  marshes  upon  which  they
depended for survival (SICHERMAN, 2011). Massive canals were dug, diverting river water
away from the southern wetlands (ADRIENSEN, 2004). Already damaged by drought (Fig.
1), much of the wetlands regressed, and people were forced to flee.
4 While  the history of  the ancient  Middle  East,  and in particular  of  Babylonia,  is  well
documented for the almost three millennia of its existence, periods of drought, economic
decline,  famine,  chaos,  turmoil  and  rebellion  are,  however,  scarcely  attested  in  the
Mesopotamian literature. A parallel can be drawn between the paucity of literature for
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these periods and the lack of  climate reconstructions,  leaving a blank in the Middle
Eastern history. 
5 Here  we  try  to  disentangle,  by  coupling  climate  modelling  and  the  translation  of
cuneiform tablets, one of the little-known periods in the history of Iraq, and show that
political repression by water deprivation during a drier period already occurred 3700
years ago in this country. A collection of 75 cuneiform tablets belonging to the archives of
Cornell University (VAN LERBERGHE and VOET, 2009; ABRAHAM et al., 2016) contains the
first  documented account  of  water  deprivation as  a  weapon of  war during  a  period
marked by precipitation decline. The tablets, originating from the town of Dur-Abieshuh
(“the  walled  fortress  of  Abieshuh”,  a  name  given  by  the  Babylonian  King  Abieshuh
[1711-1684 Before Current Era (BCE)],  are all  dated to the late Old Babylonian period
(1750-1600 BCE). These Babylonian texts provide precious insights into what happened in
Iraq following the decline of the Babylonian Empire of King Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE).
In particular, they provide evidence of socio-economic turmoil and rebellion across the
entire region south of Nippur,  the religious capital  of  Mesopotamia and its centre of
learning. Even if the reign of King Abieshuh must never be compared and assimilated to a
modern dictatorship, the excesses of Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime 3700 years later
illustrate that military strategies from 1700 BCE were still “en vogue” in the 20th century
CE.
 
1 - Materials and methods
1.1 - Vegetation model and climate parameters
6 The precipitation of 3750-3650 Before Present (BP) was reconstructed using a data-model
approach.  The  data  include:  (i)  monthly  temperature,  precipitation  and  cloud  cover
gridded at a step of 0.5° from 1901 to 2000 CE, provided by the British Atmospheric Data
Centre (CRU-TS-3-10); (ii) pollen data from the European Pollen Database to which four
sites  have  been  added,  Bereket-Turkey  (KANIEWSKI  et  al.,  2007),  Tell  Tweini-Syria
(KANIEWSKI  et  al.,  2008,  2010),  Akko/Acre-Israel  (KANIEWSKI  et  al.,  2013a),  and Hala
Sultan Tekke-Cyprus (KANIEWSKI et al., 2013b). The model is a vegetation model (BIOME4;
KAPLAN et al., 2003) that simulates the net primary productivity of broad vegetation types
given the climate of each studied sites. A set of 81 grid-points has been considered for the
climate reconstruction according to the pollen sites available.
7 Assuming that the pollen abundances are related to the net primary productivity added
to a Gaussian distribution, it is possible to reconstruct the best climate scenarios giving
the pollen composition. This procedure is called model inversion and is solved using a
Bayesian approach (GUIOT et al., 2009). Given the likelihood comparing BIOME4 outputs to
pollen data and a range for the model parameter model (i.e., a climate scenario), Markov
Chain  Monte  Carlo  techniques  produce  a  refined  probability  distribution  of  the
parameters.  The parameters  are  the  36  monthly  climatic  variables  at  81  grid-points,
which are summarized into two principal  components to simplify the data.  For each
pollen  assemblage  (grouped  into  the  13  vegetation  types  of  BIOME4),  and  at  each
iteration,  the  two  parameters  are  transformed  into  a  36-size  climatic  vector  and
introduced in BIOME4 (in addition to the corresponding atmospheric CO2 concentration
and modern soil  characteristics).  The vegetation-simulated vector is  compared to the
pollen data according to a similarity measurement. Acceptable scenarios (according to
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Markov Chain Monte Carlo rules; GELMAN and RUBIN, 1992) are used to estimate the
probability distributions of the climate parameters.
8 We focus on annual  precipitation.  Verification is  achieved by reconstructing modern
climate from the pollen data at the 81 grid-points. The correlation coefficient between
observed  and  reconstructed  annual  precipitation  on  the  81  grid-points  is  0.81.  The
gradient  between the  driest  and wettest  grid-points  is  well-reproduced,  but  with  an
underestimation  of  high-precipitation  values  and  an  overestimation  of  the  low-
precipitation ones. So the bias is -294 mm for grid-points above 800 mm and 97 mm for
grid-points below 200 mm. This is partly due to the fact that pollen sites are generally at a
higher elevation than grid-points used for climatological data.
9 The underestimation of high-precipitation values probably comes from the herbaceous
taxa,  usually attributed to steppe or desert environments,  which remain abundant in
forest sites, therefore accentuating the impression of drought. To minimize these biases,
the reconstructions are expressed as anomalies versus a  reconstructed reference map
(and not an observed one). Because we are here interested in the drought increase at
about 3750 BP (Fig.  1),  we calculated the relative anomalies map (P 3750-3650 BP - P
3850-3750  BP)  relative  to  modern  values  (expressed  in  percentages).  This  map  is
compared to the recent map (P 1990-2000 CE - P 1900-1989 CE) relative to the modern
(1900-2000 CE) mean values (Fig. 1).
10 The 20th century and early 21st century CE values on temperatures and precipitations that
have been used to draw the four ombrothermic diagrams (from 1900 to 2009 CE) for Iraq
(Fig. 2), are based on the available dataset.
 
1.2 - The cuneiform tablets from Iraq
11 The dataset is primarily based on an archive of Mesopotamian cuneiform tablets stored at
Cornell  University.  These  recently  published  tablets  reveal  the  dramatic  events  that
happened in Babylonia circa (ca.) 3700 years ago when the Empire of the renowned King
Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) abruptly declined under his son Samsuiluna (1749-1712 BCE).
Babylonian central authorities lost control over the entire South, including the religious
capital of Nippur, down to the Persian Gulf. The events, as described in this cuneiform
material, offer a frightening picture of how fast a refined civilization can decline under
changing environmental and political conditions in semi-arid regions such as Iraq.
12 The tablet collection at Cornell consists of over 10,000 items, dating from the fourth to
the second millennium BCE. Within this collection, approximately 600 tablets (literary
texts, oracles, religious texts, mathematic texts), written in the Babylonian and Sumerian
languages, have been identified as belonging to one archive. The tablets making up the
historical  basis  of  this  article  (75  tablets)  are  detailed  in  CUSAS  8  and  29  (Cornell
University Studies in Assyriology and Sumerology) where translations, transliterations,
2D+ copies and hand copies are given (VAN LERBERGHE and VOET, 2009; ABRAHAM et al.,
2016).  One  other  isolated  tablet  (reference:  WZKM  104  01)  belongs  to  the
“Kunsthistorisches  Museum in  Vienna”  and  is  made  public  in  an  article  in  “Wiener
Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes” (FÖLDI, 2014). The tablet collection is in its
entirety at the Tablet Room, University Avenue 726, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. The
most important tablets are detailed as supporting information. A small group of 24 tablets
related to the archive is stored in Norway. Digital pictures of all tablets and seals have
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been taken and can be consulted at the Cuneiform Library website of Cornell University
[http://cuneiform.library.cornell.edu/].
13 The archive originates from Dur-Abieshuh (Fig. 3), a name given by the grandson of King
Hammurabi, Abieshuh.
 
Figure 3 - Geographical map of Sumer (southern Iraq) during the reigns of Samsuiluna and
Abieshuh
The dam on the Tigris River built to dry up the southern marshes, the storage basin on the canal
Hammurabi-nuhus-nishi, the whole canal, and the location of the two cities named Dur-Abieshuh are
displayed. The blue and red stars denote the soldiers and forts respectively deployed to protect
Babylonia. The location of the Tigris and Euphrates follows the hypothesis of Steinkeller
(STEINKELLER, 2001) for the period 2100 BCE
Map created and drawn by the authors, using Adobe Illustrator CS5)
14 The fortress was built on the canal Hammurabi-nuhush-nishi (“Hammurabi provides the
people’s prosperity”), a roughly 200-km-long canal that runs parallel to the Euphrates
and which provided perennial water for the cities of Nippur down to the Persian Gulf. Not
far  from this  fortress,  a  second town by  the  same name was  erected on the  Tigris,
upstream of Abieshuh’s legendary dam. The archive describes life in the military forts
that  were  built  along  the  Euphrates  and  enumerates  all  foreign  mercenaries  who
populated these forts. Some of them are said to come from far-away regions such as Iran,
northeast  Syria  and  even  Aleppo.  Ration  lists  for  troops  stationed  in  the  military
garrisons, disbursements to military personnel and letters concerning the central and
southern areas of Babylonia make up a significant part of the archive. Once Nippur fell
out of control, the Temple of Enlil, the city’s major deity, and its personnel moved from
Nippur to Dur-Abieshuh. The cult centre of Nippur had fallen into disrepair at that time,
as demonstrated by this prayer written on a scribe’s seal to his private deity, Marduk:
“May [the scribe] Nanna-mesha, who reveres the god Marduk, (live to) see the restoration
of the Ekur temple and of Nippur”.
15 During this  period of  drought  and famine,  the kings  Samsuiluna and Abieshuh were
confronted with an enemy, the King of the Sealand. One of them by the name of Ilima-
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ilum even invaded Nippur, the “Babylonian city of the thousand temples”. To defeat this
frightening enemy whose homeland was in the Mesopotamian Marshes, Abieshuh built a
dam on the Tigris to dry up the marshes. This daring project, never equaled by any other
Babylonian king, was still remembered by the Babylonians a thousand years later. The
Cornell archive gives unexpected evidence on how and where the dam was built and how
the South of Babylonia was militarized all along the Euphrates River.
 
2 - Results and discussions
2.1 - Military forts
16 The Cornell archive firstly shows that, faced with chaos and rebellion in the South, King
Abieshuh  (8th king  of  the  1 st Dynasty  of  Babylon)  created  an  important  network  of
military forts  (birtum in Babylonian)  all  along the Euphrates River and the adjoining
Hammurabi-nuhus-nishi Canal in order to control the water system that flows to the
South and feeds the Mesopotamian Marshes (Fig. 3).  These military camps (near Dur-
Sinmuballit, Nippur, Dur-Abieshuh, Baganna and Uruk) had to ensure perennial water for
important central Babylonian cities, such as Nippur and Isin, and the southern cities of
Uruk, Larsa, Ur and Eridu (Fig. 3).  Mercenaries living in these camps originated from
settlements along the Euphrates such as Kish, Damrum, Nukar, Nippur, Isin and Larsa
(Fig. 3). However, the Tigris was exclusively protected by one military fort, Mashkan-
shapir (Fig. 3). The southern cities watered by the Tigris, such as Adab, Umma, Girsu and
Lagash, are not once referred to as having fortified outposts or as providing mercenaries,
even though these areas were very important during the preceding Ur III Dynasty (2100
to 2000 BCE) and the early Old Babylonian period (2000-1750 BCE).  Apparently,  these
cities were abandoned by their inhabitants. These historical data are confirmed by the
results of Adams’ survey of southern Iraq. He remarks that the flow of the Adab-Umma
Canal ceased entirely during the late Old Babylonian period and that the volume of water
for irrigation was reduced by this time (ADAMS, 1981). It is also in accordance with the
findings of geomorphological research in the areas around Nippur, where the absence of
any substantial agriculture south and east of the heartland was recorded for the late Old
Babylonian period (ARMSTRONG, 1994).
 
2.2 - A dam on the Tigris
17 The more insidious  control  of  the  Tigris’  flow would have taken place  just  south of
Mashkan-shapir. In the 19th year of his reign, King Abieshuh constructed a dam on the
Tigris (Fig. 3). A late historiographical text and an oracle enquiry show that the damming
of the Tigris was a military strategy of Abieshuh in his war with the Sealand enemy
(CHARPIN, 2002; GEORGE, 2013). This was considered a key event of his reign. By diverting
the  waters  of  the  Tigris  towards  the  Euphrates,  the  king  intended  to  dry  up  the
Mesopotamian Marshes, the home of the Sealand enemy, thus, starving its population.
The dam was also built to establish a more reliable water supply, via the Euphrates, for
the southern territories that were under his military control.
18 A few years later, the king built a fortress called Dur-Abieshuh a few miles above the dam
(GEORGE,  2013).  A  second  walled  town  by  the  same  name  of  Dur-Abieshuh  was
constructed at the storage basin of the Hammurabi-nuhush-nishi Canal (Fig. 4).
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Figure 4 - Cuneiform tablet CUNES51-02-138 (oACBW, rACBW) from the Cornell Archive
The translation of the cuneiform tablet mentioning the invasion of the Ekur, the most important
temple of Nippur’s chief deity, and the arrival of refugees at the storage basin at King Abieshuh’s
fortress is displayed under the picture. The letter proves that even under Abieshuh’s successor,
Ammiditana, Nippur was still under attack from its Sealand enemies
Pictures and translation: Van Lerberghe).
19 Both Dur-Abieshuhs were located close to one another: one at the inlet of a channel near
the famous dam on the Tigris, and one at the storage basin of the Hammurabi-nuhush-
nishi Canal where the channel ended (Fig. 3). Canal workers from Babylon were employed
to mix the waters of the Euphrates with, most probably, the Tigris (but these lines are
unfortunately missing on the tablet CUNES51-03-095). The best place to divert the waters
from the Tigris to mix them with the Euphrates would be at the inlet of a canal linking
both rivers. Such canals were well known in Babylonia and one, just to the south of the
fort of Mashkan-shapir, is attested for the Old Babylonian period (Fig. 3).
 
2.3 - Southern Iraq during the period of repression: a Dark Age?
20 After 1750 BCE, the major southern and central Babylonian cities (Ur, Uruk, Eridu, Isin,
Girsu,  Larsa;  Fig.  3)  seem to  have been,  at  least  partially,  abandoned since  no more
cuneiform texts or archaeological material from that period have been excavated. Even
Nippur, Babylonia’s religious capital and centre of learning during the prosperous reign
of King Hammurabi, became silent. The entire region south of Nippur sank into a Dark
Age.  Babylon lost  control  over  these  territories,  and the flourishing economy of  the
Empire  came  to  an  end  (UR,  2013).  The  southern  territories  gradually  became
impoverished and depopulated (PIENTKA, 1998; CHARPIN, 2004; DALLEY, 2009). A famine
struck its population, and new ethnic groups started to threaten the central authority,
Water deprivation as military strategy in the Middle East, 3.700 years ago
Méditerranée , Varia
8
while citizens fled the country in search of better opportunities abroad (JANSSEN, 1991;
VAN LERBERGHE and VOET, 2009). The scarcity of water was accentuated by relatively
drier conditions (Fig. 1) that developed in eastern Turkey, the source of the Euphrates
and Tigris (CULLEN et al., 2002), and extended to the northern Red Sea (LAMY et al., 2006)
(Fig. 1).
 
2.4 - Control of the Tigris’ flow reinforced by a dry phase 3750 years
ago
21 High-resolution and well-dated climate records from the central and southern Euphrates-
Tigris basin during the late Holocene are not available, but several records detail the
climatic evolution over the regions surrounding the headwaters of the two rivers during
that period (Fig. 1). Harvest-based gauges of climatic variations in Babylonia (NEUMANN
and SIGRIST, 1978) and a pollen-based environmental record from the eastern mountains
of Turkey (WICK et  al.,  2003) point to reduced rainfall  and high winter temperatures
during  the  late  Old  Babylonian  period  (NEUMANN  and  SIGRIST,  1978),  leading  to  a
reduction of the Euphrates and Tigris flows and accordingly,  increased soil  aridity in
southern dependant territories. The harsh environmental conditions that developed in
Babylonia are consistent with hydroclimatic changes recorded in the southern Black Sea
sediments that provide evidence for an unstable period with dry spells (CULLEN et al.,
2002), paralleling data from Lake Van in eastern Anatolia (WICK et al., 2003). A dry shift
(Fig. 1) was recorded in several places in the Aegean, Turkey and Syria (ROBERTS et al.,
2011), on the southern Levantine coast (SCHILMAN et al., 2001; KANIEWSKI et al., 2013a),
on the Nile Delta (BERNHARDT et al., 2012) and in the northern Red Sea (LAMY et al., 2006)
. During the reign of Hammurabi’s successor, Samsuiluna (1749-1712 BCE), the flow of the
Adab-Umma Canal ceased entirely (ADAMS, 1981) (Fig. 3). Babylonia was clearly a state in
chaos during the reign of King Abieshuh, Samsuiluna’s son and successor.
22 These  climate  records  emphasize  that  Abieshuh’s  strategy  occurred  during  a  period
marked  by  recurrent  dry  spells  (Fig.  1).  This  provides  a  first  parallel  with  Saddam
Hussein’s plan that was fully realized during the warmest and driest period since the
onset of the 20th century CE (Figs 1-2). Abieshuh’s plan, which is based on the drying up of
the Mesopotamian Marshes in order to starve and weaken the Sealand, attains its true
significance when the climate parameters are fully integrated. Natural drought probably
accentuated  the  impact  of  deliberate  water  retention  on  human  settlement  and
population migrations in southern Iraq 3700 years ago. As the marshes turned to dryland,
marsh peoples were forced to flee their homes.
 
2.5 - Hidden in the Mesopotamian marshes: the Sealand enemy
23 The instability that followed the fall of the Empire offered local rulers the opportunity to
create small regional kingdoms in the Mesopotamian Marshes and the Persian Gulf. They
attributed themselves the royal title “King of the Sealand”, as attested by several legal
tablets from Nippur (DALLEY, 2009). Due to repeated attacks, the Sealand, in the far south
of Mesopotamia, became an enemy of great concern for Babylon (e.g. the photo of the
Babylonian  letter  from  Cornell  on  the  attack  of  Nippur;  Fig.  4).  Even  though  the
Babylonians  remembered  the  strategy  of  drying  up  the  Mesopotamian  Marshes  by
diverting  the  Tigris  for  a  thousand  years  to  come,  the  late  historiographical  text
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describing Abieshuh’s bold enterprise mentions that his efforts were to no long-term
avail  (GEORGE,  2013).  The  king  never  succeeded in  defeating  his  enemy.  The  recent
publication of an archive of 463 tablets from the 1st Sealand Dynasty shows that Sealand
kings still controlled vast areas of Babylonia from the South to the North at the end of the
Old Babylonian and beginning of the Kassite period (DALLEY, 2009).
 
2.6 - The destruction of the Iraqi marshlands
24 In Iraq, the Babylonian story told by the cuneiform tablets shows that the scarcity of
water resources can be leveraged as an efficient means of pressure on southern societies
that depend on marsh areas (now called Marsh Arabs or Ma’Dan). Two-thirds of Iraq is
dryland, and the country is highly dependent on the Euphrates and Tigris for irrigation.
King Abieshuh’s strategy of drying up the Mesopotamian Marshes by diverting the Tigris
and  inhibiting its  southwards  flow  is  the  first  written  testimony  of  the  deliberate
deprivation of freshwater that would later be reiterated by many others (GLEICK and
HEBERGER, 2013) including the Saddam Hussein's regime (AMERY, 2002; ISSA et al., 2013).
25 The first modern plans for the drainage of the marshes of southern Iraq date back to the
1950s CE when British engineers proposed a series of canals, embankments and sluices on
the Euphrates  and Tigris  in  order  to  divert  salty  and polluted water  away from the
irrigated area between the two rivers (PEARCE, 1993). Saddam Hussein appears to have
reinvented these constructions for his own purposes, but with a different aim.
26 Saddam Hussein’s  first  plans for the marshes date back to the period of  1980-88 CE,
during the Iran-Iraq war (ADRIENSEN, 2004),  and were underpinned by the desire to
control Iranian intruders entering Iraq through the marshes. The plan, which forecasts a
destruction of the marshes, was fully realized at the end of the first Gulf War in 1991 CE.
The Ma’Dan, who had lived for thousands of years in these marshlands, were forced to
flee the area and find refuge in southern Iran when Saddam Hussein's regime built a
network of canals, dykes and dams to divert water away from the marshes. By 2000-2002
CE, satellite images showed that only 7-10 % of the marshlands were left (RICHARDSON
and HUSSAIN, 2006). The only remaining marsh was the northern portion of Al-Hawizeh,
which straddles the border between Iran and Iraq (Fig. 5). The Qurna and Al-Hammar
marshes were destroyed by 2000 CE (Fig. 5). The remaining Al-Hawizeh was only 35% of
its size in 1977 CE (RICHARDSON and HUSSAIN, 2006).
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Figure 5 - The destruction of the Mesopotamian marshes
These two maps (1973 and 2000) are sourced from satellite images and maps originally created by
PARTOW (2001) and modiﬁed by REKACEWICZ (2002).
27 King Abieshuh’s  plan bears a striking resemblance to the much later one of  Saddam
Hussein. While the Babylonian kings officially proclaimed that they wanted to establish a
more reliable water supply, by digging a canal along the Euphrates,  for the southern
cities, which had been devastated by harsh climatic conditions (Fig. 1), the cuneiform
tablets have revealed that the real goal of King Abieshuh was primarily to weaken and
starve the Sealand during wartime by damming the Tigris and diverting its waters. A 
historiographical  text  written  1000  years  later  also  indicates  that  “Abieshuh,  son  of
Samsuiluna, tried to defeat Ilima-ilum (King of the Sealand), so decided to dam the Tigris,
but though he dammed the Tigris, he did not defeat Ilima-ilum”. A fragmentary Sumerian
inscription of a ruler who took the epithet “king of the Tigris” built “a gate against the
rebel lands”. It has been suggested that this text belongs to Abieshuh and alludes to the
dam.
28 During Saddam Hussein’s era, the official Iraqi justification was that the project would
improve the agricultural sector and would increase the amount of water available for
irrigation (NORTH, 1993). Documents found during the liberation of Iraqi Kurdistan in
1991 CE revealed that the real goal was primarily to make the marshes controllable as
they were used as a hiding ground for Iraqi outlaws, dissidents, and opponents of the
regime, and then to make the Marsh Arabs an easy target for Saddam Hussein’s forces (
ADRIENSEN, 2004).
 
Conclusions
29 This interdisciplinary study shows that, even if water deficits will probably not be the
cause  of  major  armed conflict  in  the  Middle  East,  deprivation of  freshwater  may be
leveraged as a powerful military tool. This tool reveals to be particularly efficient for the
periods marked by weak inputs of freshwater (low precipitation, weak karstic resurgence,
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dry aquifer). While more than three millennia separate the reign of King Abieshuh and
the  regime  of  Saddam  Hussein,  their  military  strategy  focused  on  deprivation  of
freshwater supplies and their plans to starve southern Iraq were definitely equivalent,
showing the power conferred by a perverse control of water during wartime. These two
examples,  as  well  as  the  other  ancient  and  recent  abuses  worldwide  (GLEICK  and
HEBERGER, 2013), clearly indicate that the water war could be a far more deviant use of
scarce  water  resources,  especially  in  the  context  of  ongoing  climate  change.  The
recurring role of water resources as a political issue through time is clearly highlighted
when integrating ancient and modern history within environmental sciences.
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ABSTRACTS
Oil, which sparked the first Gulf War, is not the only liquid resource that may trigger global crises
from within a Middle Eastern theater.  Water -  or the lack of  it  -  could be a cause of  future
conflicts because it is the most precious natural resource that can be manipulated and controlled
by humans. Here, we report the written evidence for the diversion of the Tigris for repression
purposes in Iraq, 3700 years ago, during a period marked by precipitation decline. Our study
shows the perverted role  of human control  over  water  in the Middle  East, using freshwater
supplies as a weapon of war, especially at times when drought may have affected the inhabitants,
leaving them weak and vulnerable. The translation of  75 cuneiform tablets  from the Cornell
Archive has revealed the development of  military forts  for  the protection of  the Babylonian
heartland, and has highlighted one of the oldest known attempts to dry up the Mesopotamian
marshes to starve the southern lowlands. Independent palaeoenvironmental data and climate
modelling show that relatively drier conditions may have increased the efficiency of this military
strategy.
Le pétrole, qui a déclenché la première guerre du Golfe, n’est pas la seule ressource capable de
générer des crises mondiales à partir du Moyen-Orient. L’eau - ou l'absence d’eau - pourrait être
une  cause  de  conflits  dans  un futur  proche,  car  cette  ressource  naturelle  est  l’une  des  plus
précieuses qui peut être manipulée et contrôlée par l'homme. Dans cet article, nous rapportons
l’une  des  plus  anciennes  preuves  écrites  connues  du  détournement  du  Tigre  à  des  fins  de
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répression en Irak, il y a 3 700 ans, durant une période marquée par un important déclin des
précipitations.  Notre  étude  montre  principalement  le  rôle  pervers  du  contrôle  de  l'eau  au
Moyen‑Orient,  notamment  l’utilisation  des  sources  d'eau  douce  comme  arme  de  guerre,  en
particulier pour des périodes où la sécheresse peut avoir affecté les habitants, les laissant faibles
et vulnérables. La traduction de 75 tablettes cunéiformes provenant des archives de la Cornell
University a révélé le développement de forts militaires permettant d’assurer la protection de
Babylone et  a mis en évidence l’une des plus anciennes tentatives d’asséchement des marais
mésopotamiens afin d'affamer ces plaines du sud. Les données environnementales et climatiques
montrent que des conditions relativement sèches peuvent avoir augmenté l'efficacité de cette
stratégie militaire.
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